Hooligan Soccer
·26 de marzo de 2026
Diagnosing Tottenham’s Tactical Problems – Part 1

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Yahoo sportsHooligan Soccer
·26 de marzo de 2026

What we are witnessing with Tottenham Hotspur is a situation rarely seen. They’re a team that won the Europa League last season, and finished in the Top 8 of the Champions League group stage this season.
On paper Spurs has enough quality to comfortably compete in the upper part of the table, but are entering the final seven weeks of the Premier League campaign one point above the relegation zone. This is despite having spent most of the season under one of the league’s most consistent managers: Thomas Frank.
His replacement, Igor Tudor, is widely known for improving the performance levels of the teams he takes over. It is a deeply contradictory picture, one that points to a process far more complex and striking than the results alone can explain.
Of course, there is no single reason behind this situation. Those of us watching from the outside are usually judging only what we see over 90 minutes, without fully knowing what has happened within the team during the rest of the week. That is exactly where the purpose of this piece begins: to make visible the errors that can be observed on the pitch but are often lost in the details.
With that in mind, I have identified ten problems in total. Five are presented in this article; five more will appear in another.
Each section is supported by two visuals: the first illustrates the mistake itself, while the second presents one or more possible solutions to that specific issue. In addition, every section is structured in two paragraphs, with the first defining the problem and the second explaining possible solutions.
The main reason I chose this structure is that, in moments of crisis like these, the stakeholders of football — players, coaching staff and supporters — often focus only on the problems and are dragged into pessimism. In reality, however, the solution is often not as far away as it may seem. Naturally, the observations and suggestions presented here may not fully reflect the true dynamics inside the club; only those working internally can make the most accurate assessment of the situation. Even so, I prepared this work with a perspective that aims not only to point out the problems, but also to become part of the solution. Enjoy the read.
The distance between the wing-back (Djed Spence) and the centre-backs is far too large.

As a result, the opposition are able to exploit balls played into the space behind the wing-back. When the ball reaches the opponent in this zone, he is able to deliver a cross with no Tottenham player close enough to apply pressure.

There are three distinct solutions that can be employed to solve this problem.
When playing with a back three, the opposition striker should not be able to engage in direct 1v1 attacking actions against a centre-back, because of the numerical advantage in central defense. However, one of Tottenham’s centre-backs stepped out and made an unsuccessful attempt to win the ball, which allowed the striker to become a threat.


Tottenham are struggling to move the game from the second phase into the final third.

Of course, the most natural reason for this is the players’ lack of confidence and their tendency to panic too quickly. In this situation, when the opposition establishes central superiority with six players, the centre-back in possession becomes hesitant because of the opponent’s structure and plays the ball back to the goalkeeper, which prevents the attack from developing.
Tottenham’s centre midfielders are under tight marking, so forcing passes into them is not the right solution. Instead, the attacking midfielders (Simons and Tel) need to be more active and make runs into the space between the wing-back and centre-back.

In that case, the central centre-back could first play into the adjacent centre-back, who could then find the attacking midfielder and help the team escape that congestion. Another solution would be for either Porro or Spence — depending on which option best suits the centre-back’s stronger foot — to move slightly infield rather than staying fixed on the touchline, and ask for a longer pass from the centre-back in possession.
When the opposition are taking a throw-in, all of Tottenham’s players are crowded on the left side of the pitch from Spurs’ perspective.

If you are positioned high with the entire team against a throw-in taken in the opponent’s half, then you have to win that ball. Otherwise, with just two or three passes, the opposition can switch play to the far side and begin an attack in a completely open area.

At the very least, the right wing-back (Pedro Porro) should have been positioned on the right side of the pitch.
In addition, once the overlapping run from the opposition left-back was recognised, one of Tottenham’s attacking players should have moved out to engage him. In order to adopt a less risky structure against these types of throw-ins, the midfielders need to be spread across the pitch in a more balanced way.
Now let’s look at how Tottenham build from a throw-in and how the opposition respond.

In fact, a similar space is also available for Tottenham, but they fail to take advantage of it because, after receiving the throw-in, the player recycles the ball to the centre-back, then to the goalkeeper, and finally out to the far-side wing-back. The opposition, meanwhile, do not make the same mistake Tottenham made. Their right-back stays away from the main cluster of players, waiting for a possible transition.

What the player taking the throw-in should have done was play into centre midfield rather than into the right centre-back before the two opposition players were able to close him down.
From there, the ball could then have been worked out to the wing-back. A second solution would have been to circulate the ball to the left as they did, but then use the diagonal passing lane through the centre to switch it back to the right side. That would have allowed Tottenham to drag the opposition from side to side and physically wear them down.









































