Hooligan Soccer
·27 de marzo de 2026
Diagnosing Tottenham’s Tactical Problems – Part 2

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Yahoo sportsHooligan Soccer
·27 de marzo de 2026

We covered the first five tactical issues, and their possible solutions, in our first article. Here, we will discuss the remaining five.
Each tactical issue is supported by two visuals: the first illustrates the mistake itself, while the second presents one or more possible solutions to that specific issue. In addition, every section is structured in two paragraphs, with the first defining the problem and the second explaining possible solutions.
The main reason I chose this structure is that, in moments of crisis like these, the stakeholders of football — players, coaching staff and supporters — often focus only on the problems and are dragged into pessimism. In reality, however, the solution is often not as far away as it may seem. Naturally, the observations and suggestions presented here may not fully reflect the true dynamics inside the club; only those working internally can make the most accurate assessment of the situation. Even so, I prepared this work with a perspective that aims not only to point out the problems, but also to become part of the solution. Enjoy the read.
When the ball is with the left centre-back (Van de Ven), Tottenham try to recognize the free space on the right and switch play into that area.

However, there are two mistakes here. First, the speed of the circulation is too slow. By the time the ball reaches the right centre-back (Palhinha), the opposition have already shifted across to that side. In addition, once the opposition closes the passing lanes, Tottenham’s players remain too passive and leave the player in possession with only one option: a long ball.

There are two possible solutions that can be employed to solve this problem.
Tottenham leave the opposition right-back completely free when he moves into a central position.

He is then able to drive forward slightly and deliver a cross, while one opposition player remains free deeper and another is left unmarked between the defensive line and the midfield line. Moreover, even though four or five Tottenham players recover into the penalty area, not a single one of them moves to engage the central player.

The wing-back does not need to position himself so close to the centre-backs.
If he had stayed closer to the opposition full-back, the attack could have been stopped before it even developed. Once the cross is delivered, Tottenham may appear numerically balanced because they are defending four against four, but instead of remaining on the same horizontal line, one player should protect the penalty spot while another covers the far post.
Tottenham has tried different formations with different players throughout the season. The main reasons for this were both the failure to achieve the desired results and the constant number of injuries and suspensions within the squad.

During Tudor’s spell, they used a front two (Solanke–Muani) in one or two matches. The biggest advantage of this system is having more players inside the penalty area. However, as in this situation, a cross delivered before the strikers and the supporting player behind them (Simons) have had time to occupy the box will not create the intended attacking effect.

To address the shortcomings in this sequence, the wing-back (Porro) should have combined with the two midfielders closest to him (Gray and Sarr) and carried the attack further forward. By doing so, the forwards would have had enough time to settle into positions inside the box, which would have created a far more effective attacking structure.
In a match where Tottenham used a 4-3-3 formation, the opposition managed to carry the ball from Spence’s side all the way into Tottenham’s penalty area after the left-back stepped out to engage. Tottenham’s defenders failed to recognise the opposition player positioned deeper on the far side.

Once the ball reached him, he was able to get off a dangerous shot. In fact, because six Tottenham players inside the box were concentrated in just one area, another opposition player was also left free behind them, and had the ball been played to one of those players instead, the chance of scoring would have been even greater.

To prevent this, Tottenham’s right-back and one of the midfielders should have scanned the situation more effectively, and at least one of them needed to move out to engage that player.
In addition, instead of standing on the same line, the defenders should have adjusted their body orientation and positioning toward the two opposition players. Simply watching the ball is never the solution in these situations.
Tottenham compress themselves unnecessarily in a tight area.

The player in possession (Souza) tries to drive forward, but with pressure arriving from both in front and behind, he loses the ball while attempting to pass to one of the nearby teammates. In addition, the distance between the centre-backs is far too large, and because they don’t account for the possibility of losing possession, there is a huge area with no Tottenham player occupying it.

Instead of forcing the ball forward, the player in possession could have recycled it to the centre-back behind him, who could then have switched it across to the other centre-back.
That would have prevented this turnover. At the same time, one of the two centre midfielders could have occupied that space — both to provide central protection in case possession was lost and to offer the player on the ball a long passing option.









































